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EFFECT PRECEDES CAUSE: KANT AND THE 
SELF-IN-ITSELF 
DAVID GRAY CARLSON

 
Mention the concept of judgment to a lawyer and she will describe 
(perhaps unintentionally) the concept in Kantian terms. To be sure, that to 
which this lawyer will be referring is the synthesis performed by a judge in 
deciding whether the plaintiff in a lawsuit should or should not prevail. 
But in describing what a judge does in judging, the lawyer will inevitably 
sound at least some Kantian chords. 
Implicated in this description I am predicting is a very performative 
act, but one that purports to be otherwise. In deciding for one party or the 
other, the judge claims to be reporting a preexisting reality, but she 
actually constitutes that reality by conceptualizing it. Our legal 
interlocutor, however, would add something of which Kant would not 
approve. We lawyers think that the judge in a legal case has what Kant 
would call an intellectual intuition. This is the perfect unity of thinking 
and being.
1
 A legal state of affairs exists precisely because the judge has 
seen what the law requires and has proclaimed what legally is. As anyone 
schooled in the common law knows, legal reality never precedes the 
perception of it.
2
 But nevertheless the judge announces to us what the law 
will have demanded prior to her judgment. Law always speaks in the 
future anterior sense.
3
 
Kant assures us that ordinary mortals do not have intellectual 
intuitions. Ordinary mortals at best have amphibolies—the mistaken view 
that they have perceived the unmediated thing-in-itself.
4
 But within the 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
 1. Kant, 
contrasts the discursive or conceptual knowledge of which human beings are capable with the 
problematic conception of an intuitive intellect. Such an intellect is thought to grasp its object 
immediately, without the need for any conceptualization and without being affected by the 
object. For the latter reason it must also be characterized as archetypal or creative rather than 
echtypal: its act of intuition literally produces its object. This is, of course, precisely the kind 
of cognition generally thought to pertain to God. 
HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT‘S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: AN INTERPRETATION AND DEFENSE 65 
(1983) [hereinafter ALLISON, TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM] (footnote omitted). 
 2. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel’s Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 877, 886–91 (1989). 
 3. David Gray Carlson, The Traumatic Dimension in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2287 (2003). 
 4. Although Kant regards the conception of such an intellect as problematic, he nonetheless 
uses its bare conceivability heuristically in order to underscore his central claim that human cognition 
is not the only (logically) possible kind of cognition. This, in turn, enables him to drive a ―critical‖ 
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context of the law, the judge is no ordinary mortal. She is empowered to 
have intellectual intuitions. Accordingly, one may not go behind a 
judgment and show that it was a mistake or a hallucination. Judgments 
have res judicata value, a lawyer would say. Judgments, once issued, are 
final (if they survive on appeal). 
Kant, on the other hand, recognizes that there are hallucinations—false 
impressions proceeding from a heat-oppressed brain. This is where the 
brain misapplies the categories to sense data. The human judgments that 
schematize sense data
5
 are denied res judicata status at all times, precisely 
because we can never go behind them and verify they are correct. We can 
only bet that a judgment—the synthesis of sensual data—is correct. 
And of course if we go behind the legal mythology of the omniscient 
judge with the power to create legal realities, we find judges who are 
doubting human beings, by no means sure that their judgments are 
correct.
6
  For, unlike sovereigns whose judgments are incapable of being 
correct or incorrect, judges are law-abiding. Judicial personnel do not 
judge from a sense of arbitrary negative freedom. They swear oaths that 
they will follow the law in their judgments—that their judgments will be 
strictly what the law requires. 
In Kantian terms, the legal judgment in law is the product of 
transcendental freedom.
7
 In Kant‘s view, as expressed in the Third 
Antinomy, the judge has a foot in two worlds. Both of the worlds are ruled 
by causality. One of the worlds is where everything happens solely 
according to the laws of nature. This is a world in which there is no 
freedom
8—the world of heteronomy. The other world is also a world of 
causality, but the causality of transcendental freedom. This is the 
noumenal world of autonomy. Autonomy is ―the principle of volition in 
accordance with which the action is done without regard for any object of 
 
 
wedge between the conditions of human or discursive knowledge and conditions of things in 
themselves. ALLISON, TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM, supra note 1, at 66. 
 5. ―Schematized‖ means infused with space and time. See ANGELICA NUZZO, IDEAL 
EMBODIMENT: KANT‘S THEORY OF SENSIBILITY 62 (2008) [hereinafter NUZZO, IDEAL EMBODIMENT]. 
 6. George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 538 
(1987) (―Kant concedes that neither the actor nor an observer can ever be sure if the action proceeds 
out of duty alone‖). 
 7. Transcendental freedom is defined as the ―faculty of beginning a state from itself.‖ 
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A533/B561, at 533 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds. 
& trans., 1998) [hereinafter KANT, PURE REASON]. Speculative reason requires transcendental freedom 
―in order to escape the antinomy into which [reason] inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and 
effect it tries to think the unconditioned.‖ IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 13 
(Thomas K. Abbott trans., 1996) [hereinafter KANT, PRACTICAL REASON]. 
 8. See ANGELICA NUZZO, KANT AND THE UNITY OF REASON 53 (2005) [hereinafter NUZZO, 
UNITY OF REASON]. 
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the faculty of desire.‖9 In this world of autonomy, reason exercises ―an 
immediate and effective causality on the will. The category of causality 
lends the first meaning to the practical use of reason.‖10 Reason‘s causality 
is why one can say that Kant has a theory of positive freedom, in which 
freedom has an effect in the world.
11
 The will, then, is the middle ground 
between reason and the act.
12
 
What is autonomy for Kant? It is simply what is left over after 
heteronomy is suppressed. ―[A]n action from duty is to put aside entirely 
the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will; hence there 
is left for the will nothing that could determine it except objectively the 
law . . . .‖13 It is from this position that the moral law is pronounced. 
Therefore the law judge—or any ordinary mortal—must suppress 
heteronomy in order to be faithful to the object. In the case of the law 
judge, heteronomy would include prejudice, greed for glory or bribes, or 
tiredness at the end of a long day. All of these things must be suppressed. 
If the judge succeeds in this task, the pure objective law tells him what to 
do. In this magical Delphic state, the judge is pure oracle.
14
 The God of 
law speaks through the mouth of the judge, whose judgment is entirely 
objective in nature. With subjectivity suppressed, objectivity is able to 
shine forth through the subject.
15
 
There is a paradox here. The judge is most free when the judge is most 
bound. This is the paradox of transcendental freedom. Such a freedom 
only exists when heteronomy is entirely suppressed. So freedom is won by 
this austere, quite impossible
16
 starvation of the natural self. Yet what 
emerges, if this struggle for autonomy is successful, is the law from which 
the judge is quite unfree. We should not forget that, etymologically, 
 
 
 9. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 4:399–400, at 13 (Mary 
Gregor ed., 1997) [hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK]. The faculty of desire is defined as the ―faculty 
of becoming by means of its ideas the cause of the actual existence of the objects of these ideas.‖ 
KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 7, at 19 n.2. 
 10. NUZZO, IDEAL EMBODIMENT, supra note 5, at 144. 
 11. See id. at 156. 
 12. See id. at 188. 
 13. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 4:400, at 13-14. 
 14. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE BASIS OF MORALITY 79 (E.F.J. Payne trans., 1965) 
(―From its dark sanctuary oracular sentences infallibly proclaim, alas! not what will, but what ought to 
happen.‖). 
 15. This is basically the heart of Dworkin‘s theory of legal interpretation, which I describe in 
David Gray Carlson, Dworkin in the Desert of the Real, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505 (2006). 
 16. ―[F]reedom, though it must be assumed both for theoretical and practical purposes, is 
nevertheless inexplicable and even incomprehesible.‖ Allen W. Wood, The Antinomies of Pure 
Reason, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT‘S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 245, 262 (Paul Guyer 
ed., 2010) (citations omitted). See also KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 4:459, at 63 
(―[Freedom] can never be comprehended or even only seen.‖) (footnote omitted). 
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―autonomy‖ means ―giving oneself laws.‖17 In this respect, as always, the 
theory of the subject is not different from Kant‘s theory of objects in 
general. As Adorno writes, ―a thing is nothing other than the laws that 
underlie the individual phenomena, the individual data of my 
consciousness.‖18 Law is ―an indispensable precondition without which 
something like an organized consciousness, a consciousness that is 
logically consistent and coherent, and hence an organized, logically 
consistent world of objects, is not conceivable.‖19 Law (i.e., causality) is 
indispensable ―as a condition of all empirical judgments, and so of 
experience as such.‖20 
But here is precisely where Kant reveals himself to be the Great 
Destroyer, the consummate philosopher noir. 
La philosophie noire is a phrase designed to invoke film noir,
21
 the 
consummate example of which is Chinatown, directed by Roman 
Polanski. In this film, Jack Nicholson is a detective who thinks he sees the 
case-in-itself. At first, he is sure that he has been retained by a jealous wife 
in a routine domestic dispute with a philandering husband. But then the 
case is re-interpreted to be one concerning a corrupt real estate deal. 
Finally, it is a case of rape and incest involving a corrupt real estate 
tycoon. Every step along the way, the rug is pulled out from under 
Nicholson, who constantly learns that things are not what they seem—that 
he is simply not in control of the situation. 
This is precisely what Kantian philosophy does to the empirical self 
who imagines that he ―has the phallus,‖ as Lacan would say.22 Having the 
phallus is an amphiboly in which the empirical self imagines himself to be 
whole, unmediated, unmolested and not castrated. Such a self imagines 
himself to be in the autonomous position—in a position to know the law 
that causes him to act. Such a being acts and thinks at the same time. He
 
 
 17. THEODOR W. ADORNO, KANT‘S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 54 (1959); see also KANT, 
GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 4:440, at 47 (autonomy is ―the property of the will by which it is a law 
to itself . . .‖) (footnote omitted). 
 18. ADORNO, supra note 17, at 92. 
 19. Id. at 96. 
 20. NORMAN KEMP SMITH, A COMMENTARY TO KANT‘S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 376 (1962). 
 21. Not wishing to claim wit that is not my own, I have borrowed this phrase from Slavoj Žižek, 
but I can no longer find the reference in his burgeoning work. I seem to recall that he used the phrase 
in connection with Malebranche. 
 22. JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FACES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE 
FEMININE 80, 87–94 (1998). 
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has complete mastery of himself.
23
 Kant dashes this conceit to bits. In the 
Groundwork, Kant writes: 
It often happens that in the keenest self-examination, we find 
absolutely nothing except basic moral duty that could have been 
powerful enough to move us to this or that good action . . . . But it 
cannot be ruled out with certainty that in fact some secret impulse 
of self-love, under the mere pretense of this idea, has been the real 
determining cause of the will. For this we gladly flatter ourselves by 
falsely appropriating a nobler motivational ground. But in fact, even 
the most strenuous probing of our hidden motives yields absolutely 
nothing, because when the issue is moral worth, it is not about the 
actions one sees but rather about their internal principles that one 
does not see.
24
 
This is Kant‘s way of making the Lacanian point that we are all castrated. 
The most intimate part of our selves is in fact beyond ourselves. No one 
has the phallus. Fans of Chinatown will remember that Nicholson‘s nose is 
sliced open (by the director Roman Polansky, no less), symbolizing the 
loss of the phallus.
25
 
In his highly engaging lectures on The Critique of Pure Reason, 
Theodor Adorno states that Kant has become the favorite philosopher of 
those who are reflective only on Sunday mornings while at church, people 
for whom a nonreflective existence can be enjoyed six and a half days a 
week.
26
 But Adorno is quick to add that this adaptation of Kantian 
principles to bourgeois existence is quite contrary to Kant‘s intent. Adorno 
sees that Kantian theory is noir all the way down, if it is properly 
understood. 
The reason that it is noir is that the autonomous state is a quite 
impossible one. If our judicial officer reflects about his position in the 
Kantian style, the judge is doomed in advance to experience the doubt 
that, no matter how sincerely she tried to do the right thing, she has not 
succeeded in shutting out all aspects of heteronomous influence. The 
 
 
 23. In Lacanian terms, this is called the ―masculine‖ position. Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of 
the Market: A Psychoanaysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 504–05 (1998). ―In 
contrast, the feminine position is the part of personality that accepts the fact of castration. The 
feminine subject recognizes that her lack is self-constituting.‖ Jeanne L. Schroeder, Can Lawyers Be 
Cured? Eternal Recurrence and the Lacanian Death Drive, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 943 (2003). 
 24. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 26; see also IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF 
JUDGMENT 7 (J.H. Bernhard trans., 2000) (―[I]t is left undetermined whether the concept which gives 
the rule to the causality of the will[] is a natural concept or a concept of freedom‖). 
 25. I owe this observation about Chinatown to Rudolph Makkreel. 
 26. ADORNO, supra note 17, at 186–87. 
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slightest taint of heteronomy means that the positive law by which the 
judge is bound did not govern the judgment but some illegal inclination or 
prejudice did. Thus, ―in the case of the principle that every event has a 
cause, transcendental logic does not say what this cause is or which among 
the many possible causes is the real cause in the specific case.‖27 
What are the conditions under which a judge could be sure that the 
judgment conformed to a pre-existing law that was not hallucinated by the 
judge? The required condition is what Kant would call amphiboly—―a 
confusion of the pure object of the understanding with the appearance.‖28 
A judge must perceive herself not just as appearance but as she is in 
herself. But in truth, being a mortal, she can never know herself as such. 
She can only know the appearances of herself—that which is given in 
experience.
29
 As Kant says, 
Those transcendental questions, however, that go beyond nature, we 
will never be able to answer, even if all of nature is revealed to us, 
since it is never given to us to oberve our own mind with any other 
intuition [than] that of our inner sense. For in that lies the mystery 
of the origin of our sensibility. Its relation to an object, and what 
might be the transcendental ground of this unity, undoubtedly lie 
too deeply hidden for us, who know even ourselves only through 
inner sense, thus as appearance, to be able to use such an unsuitable 
tool of investigation to find out anything except always more 
appearances, even though we would gladly investigate their non-
sensible cause.
30
 
One of the surprising things about Kant‘s philosophy is that the 
structure is uniform, whether the subject is synthesizing quotidian objects 
around her such as houses or ships sailing down a river, or whether the 
subject is synthesizing her own empirical self.
31
 In neither case can the 
subject intuit the thing-in-itself. The subject can only synthesize the object 
from a passive receptivity of sense data—whether it be stimulation of the 
ocular or aural nerves. One can never know the thing-in-itself but only the 
appearances. But the subject‘s own self is an object. Like all objects, the 
 
 
 27. NUZZO, UNITY OF REASON, supra note 8, at 172 (citation omitted). 
 28. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A270/B326, at 371 (footnote omitted). 
 29. See ALLISON, TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM, supra note 1, at 106. 
 30. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A278/B334, at 375–76 (footnotes omitted). 
 31. ADORNO, supra note 17, at 54, 205. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/10
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subject knows this self only through the appearances. Psychology cannot 
be separated from the theory of knowledge generally.
32
 
Furthermore, there is a sense in which, whether synthesizing objects or 
synthesizing herself as an object, the subject is in control of neither. 
Appearances are taken in from the outside. At the level of sensibility, the 
perceiving subject is passive and requires an object to work upon her. This 
object is the cause of the appearance within the brain of the subject. Hence 
Kant‘s notorious doctrine of the thing-in-itself, which we cannot know but 
only infer from reflection on the concept of ―appearance,‖ which is after 
all a binary relation between that which is subjectively experienced and 
that which is objectively imposed upon us externally.
33
 
If receptivity of the senses is truly passive, then the thing-in-itself must 
be active and beyond the control of the subject. It must be the cause of the 
sense data that are synthesized into an object.
34
 Yet the self of the subject 
is itself an object and subject to the same rules.
35
 The self-in-itself causes 
the act. The empirical self passively drinks it in: 
[F]or the cognition of ourselves, in addition to the action of thinking 
that brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of 
apperception, a determinate sort of intuition, through which this 
manifold is given, is also required . . . . I therefore have no 
cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself. The 
consciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of 
oneself . . . .
36
  
 
 
 32. Id at 100. 
 33. In Hegelian terms, appearance is an essential relation that simultaneously refers to itself and 
to its other. G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL‘S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 500 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969) [hereinafter 
HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC] (Appearance is ―equally immediately a sheer positedness which has a 
ground and an other for its subsistence‖). 
 34. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A251–52, at 348 (―[S]omething must correspond to 
[appearance] which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of 
our kind of representation . . . the word ‗appearance‘ must already indicate a relation to something the 
immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself . . . must be something, 
i.e., an object independent of sensibility‖). What Kant meant by this claim of the thing that causes its 
own representation is the source of endless controversy. See ALLISON, TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM, 
supra note 1, at 237–46. 
 35. Julian Wuerth, The Paralogisms of Pure Reason, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
KANT‘S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 210, 212 (Paul Guyer ed., 2010) (―We can have knowledge of 
ourselves through empirical apperception, or inner sense, but becasue the states of inner sense are all 
located in time and are thus merely phenomenal . . . inner sense provides us with knowledge of 
outselves merely as we exist as phenomena.‖). 
 36. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at B157–158, at 359–60. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
168 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:161 
 
 
 
 
And so the Kantian self is deeply divided within itself: 
Yet the human being, who is otherwise acaquainted with the whole 
of nature solely through sense, knows himself also through pure 
apperception, and indeed in actions and inner determinations which 
cannot be accounted at all among impressions of sense; he 
obviously is in one part phenomenon, but in another part, namely in 
regard to certain faculties, he is a merely intelligible object . . . .
37
 
The Kantian self is not self-identical and for this very reason is capable of 
movement and motility. 
Self-division is not a contingent fact of human existence but is 
logically required. And this can be seen from the very structure of 
judgment. Indeed the German word for judgment (Urteil, or ―original 
partition‖) presages this.38 Traditionally, judgment is divided into three 
components—subject, copula and predicate. Judgment is usually 
represented by the form ―A is B.‖ But, as Hegel emphasized in the 
introduction to the Science of Logic, ―A is B‖ confesses identity and 
difference. ―Judgment is an identical relation between subject and 
predicate,‖ Hegel writes.39 For example, ―the rose is red,‖ or ―being and 
nothing are identical.‖ But these judgments fail to capture the whole truth: 
[T]he subject has a number of determinatenesses other than that of 
the predicate, and also that the predicate is more extensive than the 
subject. Now if the content is speculative, the non-identical aspect 
of subject and predicate is also an essential moment, but in the 
judgement this is not expressed.
40
 
In other words, the rose is many things other than red, yet this ―speculative 
content‖ is not expressed. Many things are red besides roses, but this too is 
not expressed. To quote Adorno, ―only when the knowing subject is 
identical with the object known can we conceive of knowledge as being 
free of contradiction . . . .‖41 But since judgment is at stake, this is hardly 
possible. Properly, as Adorno pointed out, if we are to consider self-
 
 
 37. Id. at A546/B574, at 540 (footnotes omitted). Intelligibility implies noumenality for Kant. Id. 
at A494/B522–23, at 512–13, A538/B566, at 535–36. 
 38. G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL‘S LOGIC: BEING PART ONE OF THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES (1830) 231 (William Wallace trans., 1975) (―The etymological meaning of 
the Judgement (Urtheil) in German goes deeper, as it were declaring the unity of the notion to be 
primary, and its distinction to be the original partition. And that is what the Judgement really is.‖).  
 39. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 33, at 90. 
 40. Id. at 90–91. 
 41. ADORNO, supra note 17, at 83. 
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knowledge, we should speak of psychosynthesis, not psychoanalysis.
42
 
Judgment is a synthesis, a re-membering,
43
 of that which is originally 
dismembered. 
Thus, a subject knows the predicates of her self as appearances, which 
arise when the subject acts. Yet, if there is to be a uniform metaphysics of 
apperceived objects and of morals,
44
 these acts must be beyond the control 
of the actor. The actor is simultaneously up on the stage acting, but also in 
the audience passively witnessing and interpreting this act from which she 
is fundamentally alienated.
45
 
Can this actually be Kant‘s position, you ask? Do we sit passively in 
the audience while a puppet with our name and wardrobe cavorts on the 
stage? Consider that the self has a heteronomous side and an autonomous 
side. From the heteronomous side, nature causes us to act. On the 
heteronomous side, there is no freedom.
46
 From the autonomous side, 
however, reason causes us to act. ―[P]ractical reason manifests itself 
through its effects in—and on—human sensibility.‖47 This seems to 
exhaust the possibilities. Either way, we are not in control of the 
performance. The performance is caused by something outside ourselves. 
There is no unity of thinking and being. Furthermore it is commonplace of 
at least Hegelian thought, and probably of Kantian theory as well,
48
 that 
―human action cannot be motivated by reason but only by passions . . . . 
Accordingly, the will‘s act (deliberation or choice) is nothing but its 
 
 
 42. Id. at 188. 
 43. JOHN W. BURBIDGE, REAL PROCESS: HOW LOGIC AND CHEMISTRY COMBINE IN HEGEL‘S 
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 136 (1996). 
 44. ADORNO, supra note 17, at 54, 205. 
 45. Žižek thus writes of the act as a foreign body or intruder in the subject, and why the actor 
must always keep a distance from her own acts. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT 
CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 374 (1999). 
 46. Kant writes: 
Thus every human being has an empirical character for his power of choice, which is nothing 
other than a certain causality of his reason, insofar as in its effects in appearance this reason 
exhibits a rule, in accordance with which one could derive the rational grounds and the 
actions themselves according to their kind and degree, and estimate the subjective principles 
of his power of choice. Because this empirical character itself must be drawn from 
appearances as effect, and from the rule which experience provides, all the actions of the 
human being in appearances are determined in accord with the order of nature by his 
empirical character and the other cooperating causes; and if we could investigate all the 
appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, then there would be no human action 
that we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as neceassary given its preceding 
conditions. Thus in regard to this empirical character there is no freedom . . . . 
KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A549-550/B577–79, at 541 (footnotes omitted). 
 47. NUZZO, IDEAL EMBODIMENT, supra note 5, at 161. 
 48. See HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT‘S THEORY OF FREEDOM 39 (1990) [hereinafter ALLISON, 
FREEDOM]. 
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mechanical response to the stimulation of the passions.‖49 And so this 
means precisely that we are spectators (in the spectral sense) to the ghastly 
Grand Guignol performance in which we ourselves are the poor players 
who strut and fret on the stage, imitating humanity so abominably. 
The fact that we are not in perfect control of our acts is a function of 
the fact that our acts are caused by a thing-in-itself beyond the subject and 
by the fact that our subject has two natures—one natural and one 
noumenal, or one evil and one holy. Which of these two entities acted? 
Only amphibolous powers can assure us of the answer either way. But 
these are quite impossible. Freedom ―is the foremost example of an object 
of thought that can never be known theoretically since it does not meet the 
conditions of our sensibility.‖50 So we are constituted as doubting beings. 
And this doubt is the very condition for the possibility of freedom. 
Doubting that our acts are our own means that we are constitutionally 
incapable, without help, of synthesizing the object that is our self. Any 
such synthesis would have subjective validity only. What we require is 
objective validity. 
This leads directly to Hegel‘s theory of recognition. In Hegel‘s view, 
we are not constituted to recognize ourselves objectively. We require 
others to bestow upon us our own sense of self. But this recognition needs 
to be from another self that is very much an equal self. So we must give to 
the other precisely what we cannot give to ourselves, which is recognition 
that the other is indeed a substance—an enduring entity worthy of moral 
respect. Only after we recognize the other as an enduring self capable of 
recognizing us can we be assured that our own self is indeed a self.
51
 
The ethics of recognition Hegel locates in the logic of judgment itself. 
In the Science of Logic, the judgment that is analyzed in the Subjective 
Logic is self-judgment. ―Judgment is ‗the omnipotence of the Notion‘ 
(662)—the tool by which the Notion reestablishes reality as its own, after 
abstract objectivism imploded upon itself in the first two-thirds of the 
Logic.‖52 In the logic of judgment, ―the Notion restores for itself a reality 
that had been canceled in Actuality.‖53 The restoration rehearses, for the 
benefit of the Notion, the entire logical progression that had earlier been 
cancelled. The judgment of existence corresponds to the logic of being. 
 
 
 49. Id. at 141. Hegel‘s oft-quoted dictum is that ―nothing great in the world has ever been 
accomplished without passion.‖ 
 50. NUZZO, UNITY OF REASON, supra note 8, at 28. 
 51. See David Gray Carlson, How to Do Things with Hegel, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (2000). 
 52. DAVID GRAY CARLSON, A COMMENTARY TO HEGEL‘S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 460 (2007), citing 
HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 33, at 590. 
 53. Id. at 463. Actuality was the last, third segment of the logic of essence. See id. at 391. 
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Two of the four judgments correspond to double-natured essence. Finally, 
judgment objectivizes itself in the judgment of the notion. But this 
objectivization is by its nature ambiguous. The judgment of self at the end 
of the day (the Apodeictic, or certain, judgment) is simply the disjunctive 
point that the subject is either objective (i.e., notional) or subjective.
54
 The 
subject cannot decide for itself. What the subject must do is build its 
predicate up so that the predicate is notional, so that two notions 
―recognize‖ the permanence—the objectivity—of their other. In short, the 
subject needs another subject to assure it of its permanence. This 
reciprocity is what Hegel names ―absolute idea.‖ Absolute idea is the 
―self-knowing Notion that has itself . . . for its subject matter.‖55 
The doubting subject needs another subject to assure it of its 
objectivity. And this leads to the theme of imputation, the capacity for 
which is the very definition of personhood for Kant. Criminal law is 
keenly interested in the state of mind with which an act is committed. For 
example, a person shoots his friend in a hunting accident. If the shooter is 
indicted for attempted murder, the prosecution must prove mens rea. This 
element of the crime is entirely un-empirical in nature—it involves 
something that cannot be observed. Of necessity, the prosecutor can resort 
to empirical evidence from which the defendant‘s mental state can only be 
inferred. Spectral evidence, once popular in witch trials, is no longer 
allowed. For example, the prosecutor might present evidence that the 
defendant was the principal legatee in the victim‘s will or was involved in 
an affair with the shooter‘s wife. The jury is then invited to judge the mens 
rea of the defendant. Kant might suggest that the jury is every bit as 
competent as the defendant himself to find this causing ground of the will. 
The defendant himself has no more access to his inner motive than does 
the jury. As with the jury, the defendant has only the evidence that he can 
sense—the visible act of holding a gun in the direction of the victim and 
the sensation that the gun has gone off. As Kant writes: 
The real morality of actions (their merit and guilt), even that of our 
own conduct, therefore remains entirely hidden from us. Our 
imputations can be referred only to the empirical character. How 
much of it is to be ascribed to mere nature and innocent defects of 
temperament or to its happy constitution (merito fortunae) this no 
 
 
 54. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 33, at 661 (―When the problematic element is thus 
posited as the problematic element of the thing, as the thing with its constitution, then the judgement 
itself is no longer problematic, but apodeictic.‖); see CARLSON, supra note 52, at 491–92. 
 55. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC, supra note 33, at 826. 
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one can discover, and hence no one can judge it with complete 
justice.
56
 
With the jury, the effects of malice aforethought precede the cause. 
Causation is, for Kant and for Hume, a story that is told after the fact to 
explain the empirical act. And this is not just true with juries;
57
 it is true 
with ourselves, in our never-ending task of explaining ourselves to 
ourselves (and to others). As Kant emphasizes, reason‘s causality is not 
temporal in nature. Here is the key passage from the Critique of Pure 
Reason: 
[A]ction, insofar as it is to be attributed to the mode of thought 
[Denkunsart] as its cause, nevertheless does not follow from it 
[Denkunsart] in accord with empirical laws, i.e., in such a way that 
it[, the action,] is preceded by the conditions of pure reason, but 
only their [the conditions‘] effects in the appearance of inner sense 
precede it. Pure reason, as a merely intelligible faculty, is not 
subject to the form of time, and hence not subject to the conditions 
of the temporal sequence. The causality of reason in the intelligible 
character does not arise or start working at a certain time in 
producing an effect. For then it would itself be subject to the natural 
law of appearances, to the extent that this law determines causal 
series in time, and its causality would then be nature and not 
freedom. Thus we could say that if reason can have causality in 
regard to appearances, then it is a faculty through which the 
sensible condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For 
the condition that lies in reason is not sensible and does not itself 
begin. Accordingly, there takes place here what we did not find in 
any empirical series: that the condition of a successive series of 
occurrences could itself be empirically unconditioned.
58
 
What I think Kant is saying in this difficult passage is that our acts are 
never mechanically caused, as is true in the empirical world or in nature. 
 
 
 56. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A551/B579, at 542 n. (footnotes omitted). 
 57. Kant, 
agrees here with Hume in not ascribing causality to things-in-themselves, that is, he does not 
conceive of causes naturalistically. In contrast to Hume, however, he believes that an ordered 
knowledge, a lawful succession of events, is only possible in the context of this form. Thus, 
whereas Hume would say that causality is merely subjective, Kant would reply, indeed, it is 
merely subjective, but this supposeduly subjective element is the necessary precondition 
without which objectivity cannot come into being. 
ADORNO, supra note 17, at 91. 
 58. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 7, at A551-53/B579–81, at 542–43. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/10
  
 
 
 
 
2013] EFFECT PRECEDES CAUSE 173 
 
 
 
 
Rather, every act is a free act and can be described as caused by reason. 
This is so whether the act is, upon due reflection, attributed to heteronomy 
or to the moral law.
59
 Whatever rule or maxim caused the act, this cause 
can never be observed in nature. ―In other words, I can no more observe 
myself deciding than I can observe myself judging, although in both cases 
I must be conscious of what I am doing.‖60 For this reason, we never know 
if our acts are the result of respect for the moral law, precisely because this 
kind of causality cannot be observed. Yet we experience ourselves as free 
to follow the moral law. 
Once the act is accomplished, we must account for it. And others 
(including juries) must account for it. The act is observable, but the motive 
is not. Motive must be inferred from the circumstantial evidence. And for 
that reason, human beings do not follow rules. This impinges on their 
freedom if the rules are absolutely prior to the act—if human beings are 
subject to algorithm. Rather the opposite is true. The rule follows from the 
inscrutable acts that we commit. The rule narrates the moral universe in 
which our acts can be comprehended. 
I leave off with a recurrent theme of Kant, both in the first and third 
Critique: The Kantian subject is a world-builder. To quote Angelica 
Nuzzo: 
We begin to orient ourselves in the labyrinth of nature, which is 
thereby progressively transformed into a systematic whole. . . . 
[W]e become [an] integral part of nature. Reflection reconciles us 
with the object we are judging and unifies us with it; our experience 
of the object is an experience of ourselves.
61
 
In the context of my current theme, what Professor Nuzzo says is doubly 
true—the self is an object. We know the self only from experience and we 
reflect upon what universals this particular experience must embody. We 
attribute to this self-object a purposiveness which expresses nothing about 
this object‘s constitution but rather expresses a subjective mode of 
apprehending this object.
62
 
 
 
 59. ALLISON, FREEDOM, supra note 48, at 40 (―[F]or Kant an inclination or desire does not of 
itself constitute a reason for acting. It can become one only with reference to a rule or principle of 
action, which dictates that we ought to pursue the satisfaction of that inclination or desire.‖). 
 60. Id. 
 61. NUZZO, IDEAL EMBODIMENT, supra note 5, at 242. 
 62. Id. at 139–40. 
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